fix(signInWithEthereum): secure SIWE verification with domain/nonce v…#1544
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maho0638 wants to merge 1 commit into
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fix(signInWithEthereum): secure SIWE verification with domain/nonce v…#1544maho0638 wants to merge 1 commit into
maho0638 wants to merge 1 commit into
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…alidation in all examples Replaced insecure `client.verifyMessage` with `verifySiweMessage` in 3 backend code examples to prevent cross-domain replay attacks. Added explicit `domain` and `nonce` validation as required by EIP-4361. This ensures that signatures are not only cryptographically valid but also intended for the correct application and not reused. Updates documentation to reflect the use of `verifySiweMessage` instead of `verifyMessage`. Part of base#1502.
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🟡 Heimdall Review Status
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Security Fix
This PR addresses the security vulnerability reported in #1502 where
client.verifyMessagewas used without validating the SIWE message'sdomainandnoncefields. This left applications vulnerable to cross-domain replay attacks.Changes Made
Updated
docs/base-account/reference/core/capabilities/signInWithEthereum.mdx:import { verifySiweMessage } from 'viem/siwe';client.verifyMessagewithverifySiweMessage.domain: req.headers.hostandnonceparameters to ensure full EIP-4361 compliance.verifySiweMessage.Impact
Developers copying these examples will now have secure authentication backends by default, protecting against signature replay attacks across different domains.
Fixes part of #1502.